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Abstract—The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is rapidly becoming
ubiquitous. However the heterogeneous nature of devices and
protocols in use, the sensitivity of the data contained within, as
well as the legal and privacy issues, make security for the IoT
a growing research priority and industry concern. With many
security practices being unsuitable due to their resource intensive
nature, it is deemed important to include second line defences
into IoT networks. These systems will also need to be assessed for
their efficacy in a variety of different network types and protocols.
To shed light on these issues, this paper is concerned with
advancements in intrusion detection practices in IoT. It provides
a comprehensive review of current Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) for IoT technologies, focusing on architecture types. A
proposal for future directions in IoT based IDS are then presented
and evaluated. We show how traditional practices are unsuitable
due to their inherent features providing poor coverage of the
IoT domain. In order to develop a secure, robust and optimised
solution for these networks, the current research for intrusion
detection in IoT will need to move in a different direction. An
example of which is proposed in order to illustrate how malicious
nodes might be passively detected.
Keywords—Intrusion detection systems (IDS), IoT security, wire-
less sensor networks, universal IDS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm concerned
with building a pervasive environment of smart devices (or
things), seeking to enhance everyday life through ubiquitous
connectivity [1]. This is accomplished via the interconnectivity
of sensors and actuators, in order to facilitate smart decisions
made via analysis of an inherent wealth of data. The IoT
technologies are expected to offer unprecedented opportunities
to interconnect human-beings. Additionally, the proposed plat-
form for the future IoT will be through Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) communications, whereby sensors and networks allow
all things to communicate directly with each other to share vital
information. This will allow us to have a truly instrumented
universe where accurate data is radially available to inform
optimal decision making.
The IoT is typically considered to have partially evolved
from the implementation of Radio Frequency Identification
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Devices (RFIDs) [1]. RFID consists of very low power, wire-
less tags used to electronically identify physical objects and
animals. Whilst allowing the wireless intelligent tracking of
objects within confined spaces, RFID tags are passive and
unintelligent. Their features disallow the ability to log and
understand their environment [2]. Thus preventing collabora-
tion with other devices and generally stunting the evolution
and further analysis of the inherent wealth of data. With the
realization that the interconnection of these devices coupled
with intelligent data analytics, may enhance services and fa-
cilities in the physical world, such devices evolved from being
passive objects to interactive, cooperative, and smart devices.
Although, still retaining the original mantra of low-power and
wireless communication, these devices combine sensors with
RFID tags to produce wireless devices capable of sensing
their environment and thus producing dynamic data. However,
due to the low power nature of these devices, their range is
limited. Therefore, by harnessing the enabling technologies
from wireless computing networks, the capabilities to produce
wide-scale sensor networks were achieved [1]. Also, in order
to economize on this sensor usage, it is important to implement
these networks in an efficient manner which is accomplished
by applying ad-hoc and distributed networking protocols.
As the need for a globalised access to networks of hetero-
geneous device types was realised in all facets of society, the
IoT was born as a vision of global interconnectivity where
embedded devices and sensors facilitate a new age of internet
connected devices to improve our lives. This is famed to
be accomplished via a mass collection and analysis of data.
However, with this enhanced interconnectivity comes further
issues.
Security within computer networks has always been a major
issue. With sensor based networks being used in a variety
of critical infrastructures and applications, the need to se-
cure them is arguably greater than ever [3]-[4]. With the
introduction of data protection laws decreeing the responsible
collection and storage of data, coupled with issues related to
privacy of the individual, the secure handling of data contained
within IoT based networks is vital to anyone. In addition,
digital forensics is becoming an essential tool for the police
as well as anyone wishing to protect their own legal interests.
Therefore the correct logging of computer network activity is
a must. IoT is an emerging technology, famed with being able
to change and improve society life, as such its security is an
important issue.
This paper focuses on providing a survey of a variety
2of intrusion detection solutions for the IoT. Each solution
attempts to improve the efficacy of detection in a number
of ways and/or minimise its resource footprint through varied
combinations of architectures, detection methods, and specific
attacks detected. Primarily, this work focuses on architecture
types and the technologies which can be detected. This is
driven by a fundamental characteristic of IoT which is related
to the myriad of current and future technologies which will
support it.
This work is reviewed for its effectiveness so as to determine
the state-of-the art for IDS in IoT. From this review comes
the proposal for a security system which leverages passive
sensor nodes to negate the currently poor security environment
presented by the open-medium and constrained devices. In
turn, this enables any number or type of detection methods
to be integrated into the system and thus, increasing accuracy
and coverage for a wide variety of use cases.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II, standards
and technologies for the IoT are introduced. Section III situates
this survey within the body of work by reviewing related
surveys. In section IV, a review of security threats to IoT
devices is provided to support the state-of-the art survey of IDS
for IoT in section V which then facilitates some proposals for
future directions in section V. Section VI provides an analysis
of the survey which drives proposals presented in section VII.
Finally, section VIII concludes the work.
II. IOT STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGIES
Despite the growing adoption and interest in IoT systems,
the term IoT merely describes the idea of global connectivity
among smart devices, i.e. it does not specifically define the
way in which these devices should communicate. Therefore
IoT might best be considered an umbrella term encompassing
a variety of technologies and standards, both hardware and
software, and does not denote any particular standardisation.
IoT networks typically consist of heterogeneous, intercommu-
nicating devices Or ”things” and their networks.
IoT networks are (in the majority) driven by and built upon
wireless networking specifications. As stated previously, RFID
is one of the founding hardware types for IoT devices. Other
low-power wireless technologies used include Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs), Near Field Communication (NFC), Zigbee,
6Lowpan etc. most of which are considered personal area
network technologies due to their low range and bandwidth.
Networks may also be constructed upon slightly longer range
such as WiFi [5]. In addition, IoT devices may utilize wide area
protocols [6] such as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS),
3G, 4G, WiMax etc. or bridging with wired protocols to
facilitate access to the internet and other external networks [7].
Whilst these protocols and technologies are not specifically de-
signed for IoT, their integration and potential use is illustrative
of the array of protocols which will require consideration. An
extensive survey of these technologies is given in [8].
IoT may be thought of as a 3-layer model, consisting of
the perception, transportation and application stages [7] [9].
The perception stage consists of the sensing technologies such
as RFID, GPS, and short range transmission such as bluetooth
TABLE I. A NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF STANDARDS AND PROTOCOLS
USED IN IOT
Name Layer Description
COAP Application Constrained Application Pro-
tocol
HTTP Application HyperText Transport Protocol
MQTT Application MQ Telemetry Transport
XMPP Application Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol
REST Application Representational State Trans-
fer
IPV4/6 Network Internet Protocol 4 / 6
RPL Network Routing Protocol for Low
power and Lossy Networks
6Lowpan Network IPv6 over Low power Wire-
less Personal Area Networks
IEEE 802.15.x Link / Physical IEEE Wireless Personal Net-
work Standards
IEEE 802.11 Link / Physical IEEE Wireless Local Area
Network Standards
IEEE 802.3 Link / Physical IEEE Local Area Network
Standards
2G/3G/4G/5G Link / Physical 2nd-5th Generation of Mobile
Telephony Standards
RFID Link / Physical Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion
NFC Link / Physical Near Field Communication
WiMax Link / Physical Broadband Wireless
Metropolitan Area Networks
ZigBee Link / Physical High-level Wireless Personal
Area Network Standard
GPS Other Global Positioning System
and IEEE 802.15.4. The transportation stage consists of longer
range communication involving for instance IP, IEEE 802.3,
4G, etc. Whilst the final application phase consists of platforms
such as cloud architectures for data management and actuators
(e.g. traffic management systems).
Due to the resource constraints of the devices, some pro-
tocols have been designed specifically to support low power
hardware. For example, IEEE 802.15.4 is a low power physical
and media access specification for resource constrained wire-
less hardware. For instance, Zigbee and 6Lowpan are both built
upon this specification [10]. With networking protocol packets
being mostly too large for constrained resources, 6Lowpan
was developed as a low resource replacement. Specifically
designed to connect constrained devices to the internet; 6Low-
pan provides compression in order to accommodate IPv6 over
IEEE 802.15.4 or other low power physical and media access
protocols. In the literature, 6Lowpan is often discussed with the
Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), a
multi-functional routing protocol for constrained devices where
both are considered the most common IoT based networking
set-ups [11].
Within security specifically, the lack of standardization
creates issues when attempting to develop generalized research
solutions to determine exactly what must be secured. There-
fore, this section described an overview of the characteristics of
IoT technologies, including the networking technologies used
and the specific device features. IoT based networking stacks
may be considered as a typical layered networking stack, with
each layer being dependent upon the other.
As IoT based networks may still be quite diverse, it is
important to consider all types of IoT protocols. A non-
3exhaustive overview of protocols and standards which may be
seen in current IoT systems are depicted in Figure 1. Here we
focus on intrusion detection for those developed specifically
for IoT networks (such as 6Lowpan) in addition to short range
wireless network protocols (personal area networks). For a
more comprehensive coverage of IoT enabling protocols please
see [7].
III. RELATED SURVEYS
Due to the key point made in the previous section regarding
the diverse array of technologies composing the IoT, likewise
there is a variety of surveys to match them. What follows is a
non-exhaustive list of some surveys which are relevant to IoT.
Many reviews which cover traditional (predominately wired)
networks can be found. However as a consequence of the
maturity of the field, in addition to the diversity of techniques
available, these surveys tend to focus on a particular aspect
of IDS. The array of methods used to merely detect attacks
is evidenced via the variety of surveys available. For exam-
ple, machine learning and data mining techniques are often
leveraged due to the vast array of networking data available.
In [12], the authors provide a survey on machine-learning
and data-mining techniques focused on IDS for general sys-
tems which are regularly mentioned in literature specific to
IoT and WSNs(i.e., although the survey is not inclusive of
these WSNs). They highlight a number of issues with these
methods, in particular the variety and complexity of these
methods requiring optimisation according to the specific use-
case and technique. Additionally they note that one of the
driving factors for the success and validation of these methods,
the availability of quality data, appears to be somewhat lacking.
IDS for WSNs have received considerable attention in litera-
ture, perhaps due to their resource constrained nature ensuring
their security is difficult. In [13], the authors provide a very
comprehensive survey of the characteristics of IDS in WSN
(such as architecture, detection methods etc.) and highlight a
number of interesting shortcomings in current works. These
shortcomings include the low amounts of data available for
validation (such as through simulation or implementation),
poor energy consumption optimisation, and the lack of uni-
versal attack detection. A key point which is relevant to IoT
within [13] is that these WSN IDS solutions fail to take into
account internet-enabled attacks (such as Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks) which will often be launched external
to the network. Therefore, these solutions are only suited to
one section of an IoT network.
A similar review to [13], which focuses on IDS for WSN,
is introduced in [14]. Whilst still covering the fundamental
characteristics of the IDS solutions, one of the main con-
tributions in this work is the applicability of Mobile Ad-
hoc Network (MANET) IDS to WSN. It is to be noted that
these solutions are not directly applicable to static WSNs.
Additionally the authors in [14] conclude with a number
of recommendations which allow the selection of the most
appropriate architecture and detection method according to
use-case. As with the previous studies, these use-cases fail
to take into account heterogeneous technologies and use-cases
which will be prevalent to IoT.
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are related to IoT systems in
that they are composed of both physical sensors and actuators
networked with computer-based control systems. Some of
the key differences include: the time and critical nature of
the applications in addition to not requiring connection to
the internet. A survey of IDS for CPS is given in [15].
After a classification of detection methods and the qualifying
audit data, the authors in [15] propose a summary of their
findings although many are intuitive and apply to all IDS solu-
tions (such as the relationship between false positive/negatives
against detection methods.) However the authors do indicate
the most effective techniques for CPS according to use-case
and additionally highlight a number of gaps in literature. These
include: a lack of IDS metrics (validation issues as before),
lack of multitrust data, little research focusing on attacker
behaviour, a lack of anomaly-based models, and a lack of
research focusing on specific CPS use-cases (e.g. automotive).
Whilst this survey also not focused on the characteristics of
IoT, the similarities prevalent within these areas provide some
cross-over.
In contrast to the previously discussed reviews, the authors
in [16] present a brief survey focused on IDS specific to IoT.
They note that IDS cover a number of different technologies,
including RFID, LANS, WANs, WLANs, AD-Hoc networks,
cloud systems, and mobile devices. The key point being that
implementation and detection methods are different depending
on the particular technology. This is important point in the
context of IoT due to the variety of technology types available.
In [16], it is highlighted that a successful IDS for IoT will
require coverage of all service layers. A less brief survey
focusing on IDS in IoT is presented in [17]. In their work,
the authors introduce an overview of IoT devices, suggesting
that the IoT paradigm consists of 3 phases: 1) collection, 2)
transmission, 3) processing, management, and utilisation. In
the same work, the authors present an array of technologies
available to IoT devices with a focus on novel wireless
technologies. The survey concludes by highlighting a number
of issues including: the lack of solutions which cover a range
of technology types, attack types and as with the previous
studies, poor validation of solutions.
In summary, the aforementioned surveys highlight the fol-
lowing points:
• Detection methods - A variety of detection methods
exist with varying effectiveness. Often they only detect
specific attacks and for specific technologies.
• Technologies detected - The vast majority of work
appears to only cover one technology type, e.g. WSN,
6LowPan or RFID, there is a distinctive lack of works
which universally covers the entire IoT domain.
• Validation of use-cases - whilst a vast array of tech-
niques are shown, many are improperly validated via
simulation. Additionally there is a lack of comparable
data sets available.
• Unsuitability of traditional IDS - a highlighted point
agreed amongst numerous surveys is that traditional IDS
techniques are unsuitable for IoT networks. Not only due
to the lack of technology coverage, as detailed above,
but also due to the pervasive non-determinable nature of
4TABLE II. NETWORK LAYER INSECURITIES
Networking Layer Attack Facilitating Features
Physical External deployment, open wireless medium, em-
bedded design, constrained resources
Link-Layer Contention based access / collision avoidance
Network multi-hop routing, decentralization, broadcast
transmissions
Application Insecure-lower levels, lack of encryption
device traffic and location.
The diversity in the aforementioned surveys indicates that
a review of security for IoT must be scoped effectively.
Specifically, none of these surveys cover all technology aspects
of IoT, which is deemed essential due to the heterogeneous
nature of modern IoT environments. Therefore, this survey will
attempt to review IDS for IoT from a broader technological
scale and propose advisories to these shortcomings.
IV. IOT SECURITY: THREATS AND PRACTICES
In this section, an overview of currently known security
issues within IoT are critically reviewed. Predominately, these
security issues relate to the CIA model. Due to the heavy
data collection and processing aspects of IoT, it is particularly
prevalent to ensure data security (Availability, Integrity, Confi-
dentiality). Types of attacks on data may be classified as being
passive or active [18]. While passive attacks are concerned
with the theft of data or privacy subversion, active attacks are
concerned with the destruction, or subversion of data within
the network. Table II lists the features at each networking layer
which have been known to create security related issues within
IoT networks.
A number of inherent characteristics of IoT cause security
issues to be prevalent and varied from conventional security
issues. These mostly stem from the perception layer, due to the
constrained nature of these devices. According to [19], all these
security issues can be thought of an extension of device power
limitations, something conventional security solutions do not
suffer from due to their non-mobile nature. As a unconstrained
energy source is able to support large amounts of memory and
processing, cryptographic principles which are the foundation
of information security require considerable processing and
memory for key storage and processing in order for it to
be effective [19]. However, technology and implementation
related issues are not the only area which causes IoT devices
to be insecure. Profit-driven business and a novel, competitive
market causes device manufacturers to consider security as
an afterthought, if at all [9]. Due to the predominate sensing
nature of the devices, theft of data is considered the largest
risk. Unfortunately, the data is often seen to be too trivial for
concern. However, this tends to be far from the truth e.g. Smart
Meters can betray privacy and even physical security breaches
through the leaking of data [20]. A deeper concern is with
smart cities, where data privacy issues may cause ”an unequal
society” through discrimination [21].
To manage the scope of this section, it primarily highlights
threats within the perception layer of the IoT Model. This
is as threats to traditional networks are covered extensively
throughout literature and link with the transportation and
application layers predominately.
A. Perception
Whilst the architectural features of IoT networks at the
perception layer ensure that their applications are employed
economically, efficiently and reliably, these networks still re-
main vulnerable to a variety of attacks due to inherent security
issues relating to resource constrained devices, open-access
network medium and the heterogeneity of the devices [22], [9].
When modelling IoT based devices upon a network protocol
hierarchy (e.g. OSI), it should first be considered that many
attacks may originate from the physical layer. This is where
the perception layer lies on the IoT model. These issues are
similar to those found in WSNs [19] and fundamentally stem
from device limitations such as limited battery life, constrained
computational process, and open wireless networking medium
which cause the implementation of traditional security pro-
cesses to be difficult [14]. Some solutions have been presented
to mitigate issues at this layer, which predominately involve
the inclusion of the aforementioned security features in a
constrained form or physical security to the device itself. Many
of these solutions have been shown to be flawed, due to
the constrained nature as mentioned previously (such as with
IEEE 802.15.4 [23], bluetooth [24], RFID [25] or WiFi [26]).
Additionally, these solutions do not protect attacks from upper
layers as this requires an adequate IDS [9].
Although it is essential to assess all layers within this model,
a strong focus should be on the physical layer. A major attack
surface is presented at this layer in which the devices are
deployed in external areas ensuring they are open to attack.
For example, physical access to the device provides an attacker
with the ability to alter the integrity or availability of the
device, whilst the open networking medium is susceptible to
jamming or breach of confidentiality [27], [28]. A breakdown
of known attacks on these systems is given in Table III.
B. Transportation
In upper networking layers, such as those related to the
transportation layer of IoT, characteristics of the networking
protocols used create further issues: multi-hop or broadcast
routing, an open network medium, decentralized architecture
and many more are just some examples of the widely preva-
lent multi-layer insecurities [27]. To mitigate these issues,
inspiration may be found within traditional computer security
solutions within which application layer protocols and services
are often protected by firewalls or IDS at the lower levels.
Unfortunately, implementations of typical computing security
practices are heavy in terms of resource usage; and resources
on IoT devices are constrained so as to keep the cost of device
to a minimum. In this way, security is often an afterthought of
most manufacturers and not given priority over functionality
[9].
Using protocols further away from the perception devices
tends to be more secure, leveraging features such as IPSec
for end-to-end, authentication and integration encryption in
5IPv4/6 which is feasible due to the larger resources available
upon the devices. However as this traffic crosses from the
less constrained to the highly constrained, novel solutions
are needed. Additionally some technologies still suffer from
fundamental issues such as DNS spoofing [29], IPv4 and IPv6
[30] man-in-the-middle, and routing attacks [31]. Although
these may be more easily detected with the use of an IDS
than their constrained counterparts.
C. Application
IoT Application layer technologies typically involve those
involved with the service themselves, often situated around
message passing [9] and may traverse all areas of the network
from the perception layer sensors to the back-end support
systems. The result of which creates the variety of ”SMART”
solutions available such as smart cities [21]. Therefore the
application layer will span a multitude of devices. Hence, the
security solutions will need to reflect this accordingly.
As with the transport layer, cryptography is easily deployed
on the back-end or end-user devices but less supported on the
perception devices with IDS are also more easily supported
[17]. Therefore, protection at this layer will ideally need to
span all networking layers where interoperability amongst
them is cited as a key issue for the security of IoT [9], [32],
[33].
V. STATE-OF-THE-ART INTRUSION DETECTION IN IOT
This section begins by an overview of IDS followed by an
extensive survey of IDS characteristics for IoT.
IDS are a widely established networking security compo-
nent. Although they are a form of detection (second line of
defence), and not protection; their use in wireless networking
is unparalleled as preventative security measures are difficult
to implement [41]. The scope of this work is on reviewing
IDS built for IoT networks. This is different from works such
as [42] which involve building an IDS for physical intrusions
from IoT devices. IDS may also be found in different forms:
host-based and network-based, where host-based systems mon-
itor activity on the system itself (API calls, disk activity,
memory usage etc.) whereas network-based systems monitor
network activity and communications. In a general sense,
IDS will monitor behaviour (either host activity or network
traffic) for signs of attack, working under the assumption that
nominal behaviour and malicious behaviour are distinct [43].
There are two prominent metrics for measuring the efficacy
of an IDS; referred to as false positives and false negatives.
A false positive occurs when legitimate traffic is reported
as illegitimate where false negatives occur when illegitimate
activity is not detected at all. It is noted that due to the sparse
availability of data sets for IDS, the efficacy of measuring their
performance is contentious [44].
Many different techniques have been proposed in literature
for building various types of IDS. The majority of these
are particularly resource intensive due to the scale of both
signature-based databases and anomaly models [45]. In ad-
dition, both of the aforementioned detection methods require
aperiodic updates in order to keep the database or models
accurate. Due to this inherently heavy resource, both detection
methods are not well suited to the constrained resources of IoT
embedded devices [16],[15],[14]. Different attack detection
methods are covered widely across literature and other surveys.
The review will categorise the work upon architecture type
employed but with a focus on the technology detected.
In general, detection types are typically classified as: misuse,
anomaly, specification or a hybrid [14]. Misuse detection
techniques employ a database of known attacks. Activities
such as network traffic or system-level actions are compared
to signatures within this database. If there is match, then
the activity is flagged as suspicious. Examples of suspicious
network activity might be repeatedly testing for open ports,
or the detection of shell code within network packets. Misuse
detection is very successful on detecting attacks that are known
(low false positives) but are poor at detecting attacks that are
unknown (high false negatives). This is due to the lack of
signature for novel attacks. Additionally, storing and updating
databases of signatures is impractical on constrained devices
[13].
Anomaly detection techniques take a contrasting approach
in which a model of typical activity is built which then enables
current activity to be compared against this model where
any discrepancies are flagged as suspicious. For example, the
model might record the time and usage of all applications
on a system and if an application is used outside of normal
hours (e.g. at midnight instead of during working hours)
then anomalous activity will be flagged. Alternatively with
networking based activity models, if a server is suddenly
seen to be connecting to an address or service which is not
typical then malicious activity will be flagged again. Anomaly
detection techniques excel at detecting new attacks where
misuse detection methods would typically fail and thus, have
low false positive rate. However, they tend to suffer from a high
rate of false positives if the model is not periodically updated.
The varying nature of wireless communications may cause
false positives. Additionally, periodically updating the models
may be resource intensive and thus put strain on resource-
constrained devices [14].
Specification based techniques combine attributes of
anomaly and misuse detection. As before, this involves the de-
tection of anomalous activity from a pre-defined model. How-
ever, in contrast, the activity must be confirmed as malicious
by a human participant [14]. This technique is advantageous
due to the increased accuracy but introduces a delay in the
creation of a signature due to the human interaction, which
causes the process to not be timely.
Hybrid detection techniques will involve any combination
of the above, whereby issues related to the efficacy of one
technique is mitigated by the strengths of another [17].
As previously mentioned, IoT technologies are wide and
varied. The classification of work according to technology type
can be difficult for a number of reasons. Often due to the
vagueness of the solution such as a lack of implementation
and pure theoretical proposal. A large amount of work merely
lists WSNs, which themselves may be composed of differing
protocols, whilst others list a specific device type such as mo-
bile (smart phones, laptops) multi-layers / standards or merely
6TABLE III. PERCEPTION LEVEL IOT ATTACK SUSCEPTIBILITY
Attack Facilitated by IoT Feature Result of Attack Type Examples
Device Jamming [34] Open wireless medium, em-
bedded design,
Denial of service Active Random, reactive, constant,
deceptive
Network Sniffing [35] Open wireless medium, inse-
cure routing, decentralization
Data disclosure, privacy Inva-
sion
Passive -
Battery Exhaustion [36] Embedded design, open wire-
less medium
Denial of service Active Traffic flooding,
Device Cloning [37] External deployment, open
wireless medium
Denial of service, data disclo-
sure
Active/Passive -





Routing Attacks [39] Multi-hop networking, decen-
tralization
Denial of service, data misdi-
rection, data subversion
Active Selective forwarding, packet
alteration, sinkhole
Cryptographic Attacks [40] Open wireless medium, con-
strained resources
Secured data disclosure Active/Passive Brute force
atomic standards e.g. bluetooth. The review as detailed in the
following sections has attempted to list these as accurately as
possible given the available information.
This section has noted that there is a variety of IDS architec-
ture implementations. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the
efficacy of this software under varying conditions including:
attack types, architecture, detection method and performance.
Here, we classify the work according to architecture type with
a focus on technology detected. In contrast to previous surveys
which classify the IDS work into varying architecture types,
this survey categorises them into the following:
• Centralised - the entire IDS is placed in a central, either
remote or host-based location.
• Distributed - the IDS nodes are places among multiple
or all nodes within the network and responsibility is
divided amongst them.
• Hierarchical - may be stand-alone or in combination
with another architecture type in which some nodes have
a greater responsibility for processing than others. De-
centralised architectures are grouped under hierarchical.
• Hybrid - any combinations of the above. Often found
in tandem with multiple detection types.
Figure 1 illustrates some examples of the architectural
differences between IDS placement strategies reviewed. The
following subsections will review the surveyed work following
the categories as above.
A. Centralised
Systems which monitor data from a single location and
conduct processing on an external device have advantages in
that they do not impose an extra overhead on the sensor nodes.
Moreover these single node systems do not create additional
points for subversion and allow for greater depth of processing.
However, by moving the data analysis to an external agent,
they create a single point of failure. In contrast, alternative
methods involve monitoring at the sensor node level such as
in [46]. In [46], the authors develop an anomaly based network
intrusion detection system (NIDS) where each sensor node
contains a lightweight application to monitor its own and/or
other communication to detect ZiGBee devices only.
In [36], the authors present an anomaly host-based intrusion
detection system (HIDS) which detects battery exhaustion
attacks (a type of DoS) which targets one process, an attack
particularly relevant to IoT devices due to their constrained
power source but specific for mobile devices such as laptops.
Whilst a similar approach is seen in [47], both of these methods
use anomaly profiling as a HIDS. Although able to detect a
specific attack, the validity of the results is limited due to
potential subversion of the devices. On different front, the
authors in [48] develop methods to deploy misuse detec-
tion upon the constrained devices through optimised pattern
matching algorithms. Whilst the methods were evaluated in
a centralised manner upon one device, the value of this
work shows that these techniques may permit distributed or
decentralised distribution of an IDS over multiple constrained
devices. However, arguably the hardware used has still greater
resources than more constrained nodes such as those employed
in WSN. A similar approach which uses optimised matching
algorithms for constrained devices but for anomaly detection
is presented in [49]. The method in [49] involves deep packet
inspection and its accuracy and performance is shown to be
rather effective. Such a centralised implementation would need
to be deployed depending on particular use-case. For example,
on a device which is constrained but relatively isolated from
other constrained devices so as to not be able to leverage
collaborative resources.
Two IDS in [50] and [51] which are concerned with
bluetooth technologies both employ misuse detection, in a
centralised manner, as a remote NIDS. The efficacy of this
approach is considered higher than employing the system
on the target nodes. This is due to the increased resources
available for storage and processing of networking data. Sim-
ilarly, in [52] the authors deploy their misuse detection in a
centralised remote server which monitors 6lowPan networks
through the use of probes. As is often the shortcoming with
misuse detection, this technique only permits the detection of
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and for only one
technology. However, the authors claim that the platform has
the ability to be integrated as a hybrid detection method, which
would considerably improve the performance.
An improvement on the host-based centralised detection is
shown in [53] where the authors present a system to detect
DoS attacks using a hybrid detection method. In that, an
external host monitors the network via secure wired probes.
Unlike previously discussed works, this system is designed
7Fig. 1. The traditional architecture types which are currently proposed for IoT based networks. The letter I represents the placement of the IDS. The top two
networks indicate a distributed and hierarchical architecture. The edges between nodes indicate available communication paths. The bottom diagrams indicate 3
possible solutions for centralised processing. The leftmost diagram indicates centralised processing upon the border router, the central on an external node and
the third on a single node.
for 6lowPan networks. Therefore, its solution is dedicated to
IoT based networks.
Using specialised hardware and smart batteries, the authors
in [54] employ an HIDS for anomaly detection. Despite the
additional expense, a method such as this indicates how trust
can be employed locally through the application of ”trusted”
hardware. Of course an adversary who might subvert the
hardware would still be able to subvert the device at the
physical layer. However an attack such as that would likely
be costly.
B. Distributed
A number of anomaly detection techniques employ dis-
tributed architectures but in a watch-dog based manner. This
involves a subset of the network monitoring the other nodes.
In [55], the authors employ a statistical trust-based method for
attack detection in WSN which shows good levels of success
against a variety of attacks. The authors in [56] attempt to
minimise the resource consumption of anomaly methods using
weak hidden Markov models in addition to the watch-dog
technique. They employ both NIDS and HIDS and show suc-
cess in detecting some specific attacks although with variable
accuracy. Another watch-dog based method presented in [57],
detects attacks under the assumption that nodes in the local
cluster will behave alike. Even though the authors claim that
this method is unlike anomaly and misuse methods, the method
is in fact a hybrid model. Whilst watch-dog based models may
have benefits such as reducing the resource requirements of the
overall IDS, the watch-dog nodes themselves may still suffer
from subversion and thus monitoring the other nodes may be
untrusted.
In [58], the authors successfully leverage learning automata
(LA) on a distributed architecture to detect DDoS attacks.
The method is particularly commendable as it is designed
for heterogeneous devices and therefore, covers a wide area
of the IoT. The solution fails, however, to take into account
subversion of the system or protocol itself. For example by
falsifying a DDoS it may be possible to cause a DoS against
the network. Along the same lines, in [59], the authors propose
a hybrid detection system which leverages Computation Intel-
ligence (CI) in an attempt to overcome numerous shortcomings
of traditional WIDS. The details of the proposal are slim so
evaluating its success and performance is difficult. However
encompassing multiple architectures and detection types is
8certainly of merit, although one might argue the complexity of
such an architecture increases the attack surface of the system.
Through clustering, a specification method in [60] was
presented to optimise resource consumption of the overall
IDS, leveraging host and network monitoring. The downside
to this architecture is its difficulty in detecting other types
of attacks. On the other hand, in [61], the authors present
an anomaly NIDS which utilises mobile-agents for IDS of
enhanced resource optimisations and fault-tolerance. In [61], it
is noted that using purely distributed over hierarchical methods
decreases the chance of subversion. However, although the
mobile agents decrease resource consumption for the IDS, they
increase energy consumption on the particular nodes they are
active upon and thus skew the node’s current work.
In [62], the authors describe an artificial-immune system
based machine-learning approach ”for the IoT”. The method
appears to be a hybrid/specification based due to signatures
created by the technique which then must be inserted by the
administrator. However, the particular technologies this system
applies to and the problem of IDS placement need further
investigation. Similar work has shown that such techniques
may be employed in a distributed manner but the resource
requirements for constrained devices are questionable. A prac-
tical implementation which is evaluated under simulation is
found in [63] which is designed specifically for WSN. The
authors note that false positives are often generated due to
fluctuations in the RF signal quality.
C. Hierarchical
Artificial immune systems (AIS) have shown success as
an anomalous detection in conventional networks. In [3], the
system spans multiple network scales in a hierarchical fash-
ion. It utilises NIDS, HIDS and wireless intrusion detection
system (WIDS) showing success in interoperability across
heterogeneous network types. The system takes into account
the excessive false positives within anomaly based methods
via cooperative information to dramatically increase accuracy.
Systems of this form are likely to be highly deployable
across large and heterogeneous IoT networks, although there
are many issues which must be considered regarding the
complexity of the system.
In [64], the authors introduce a distributed system which
inherits a hierarchical approach by applying data-mining as
an NIDS. The detection method is also hybrid by employing
a modelling method which detects multiple attack types. It
is noted that the architecture employing a centralised agent
creates a single point of failure in this system. On a different
front, a hierarchical watch-dog based NIDS in [65] is employed
to detect a multitude of attacks using a specification-based
scheme on IPv6 WSNs. In this case, a rule must first be
detected but then approved by an administrator. The efficacy
of the proposed latency in detection is a shortcoming of this
method. The watch-dogs have attacks specific to their location
which aid in resource optimisation and minimisation of false
positives. A watch-dog NIDS in [66] applied to hierarchical
clusters is shown to detect sink-hole attacks using a trust
method for 6lowPan networks. Similarly, the concept for a
distributed and hierarchical, watch-dog based NIDS use for
anomaly detection in RPL is given in [67]. It is shown that the
hierarchical component which relies on the edge router’s lack
of subversion is a single point of failure within this system.
An NIDS for detecting sink-hole attacks for Routing Pro-
tocol for Low-power (RPL) devices, which deploys one com-
ponent on the border router and others distributed across the
remaining nodes is presented in [68]. The hierarchical nature
of this system, which relies upon nodes forwarding packets for
other nodes again creates an attack target for subversion. On
the other hand, the authors in [11] present NIDS described as
specifically for the IoT. The proposed IDS employs a hybrid of
both anomaly and signature techniques to detect routing attacks
via the RPL metric. In [69], the authors provide an extension to
this work which utilises another metric to detect attacks using
an anomaly method. Despite this, the architecture covers only
6lowpan technologies. Whilst 6lowpan is arguably the most
considered IoT technology, it does not cover all types. The
architecture is decentralised and hierarchical due to processing
more data on higher resource edge node. Another hierarchical
anomaly based NIDS is presented in [70] which uses learning
automata upon resource (or energy) information of forwarded
packet (routing) attacks in WSN only. A similar technique
can be seen in [71] where the authors propose an NIDS
which combines both misuse and anomaly detection to cover
multiple attack types. In that, the work is aimed at mitigating
issues relating to accuracy via the hybrid method which
also results in greater complexity and resource consumption
on each node. Furthermore, the authors in [72] also apply
anomaly based machine-learning for detection in a hierarchical
manner. However, this time the authors employ both HIDS and
NIDS but the implementation was not discussed to indicate
the efficacy of the solution. Another anomaly method which
leverages ant-colony optimisation upon cluster heads is found
in [73]. This method detects routing attacks only, although the
authors discuss that their detection method is able to detect
both internal and external attacks, as opposed to just one.
VI. ANALYSIS
Overall, there is considerable variety in the reviewed work.
Table IV provides an overview of the key characteristics
reviewed. A summary of key points is presented below.
A. Technology Coverage
Overall, network solutions are typically tailored to a specific
protocol e.g. Bluetooth, 6Lowpan or WSNs. Few works focus
entirely on all proposed technologies within the IoT domain.
Therefore proposing to name these works as IoT IDS is
questionable and may lead to end-users being unaware of the
scope of their products, or organisations requiring multiple
products to cover multiple technology types and areas. Ques-
tions of interoperability and effectiveness between interactive
components are left not specified, as such the future of this
area is uncertain, giving rise to further issues relating to attack
surface and solution complexity. Some works such as [3] and
[52] attempt to mitigate these issues by encompassing a wide
variety of components. However, even these solutions do not
9TABLE IV. OVERVIEW OF SURVEYED IDS FOR IOT LITERATURE
Reference Architecture Tech Focus Detection Method Type
[50] Centralised Bluetooth Misuse NIDS
[36] Centralised Mobile devices Anomaly HIDS
[47] Centralised Mobile devices Anomaly HIDS
[53] Centralised 6LoWPAN Hybrid NIDS
[51] Centralised Bluetooth Misuse NIDS
[54] Centralised Mobile devices Anomaly HIDS
[48] Centralised IP WiFi Misuse NIDS
[49] Centralised IP application Anomaly NDIS
[52] Centralised with probe 6LoWPAN Misuse NIDS
[74] Distributed WSNs Anomaly HIDS
[61] Distributed WSNs Anomaly NIDS
[75] Distributed WSNs Hybrid NIDS
[58] Distributed Multi-Layer Specification NDIS
[59] Distributed Wireless protocols Hybrid Hybrid
[62] Distributed WSNs Signature NDIS
[60] Distributed RPL Specification Hybrid
[55] Distributed watchdog WSNs Anomaly NIDS
[56] Distributed watchdog WSNs Anomaly HIDS, NIDS
[57] Distributed watchdog WSNs Hybrid NIDS
[72] Hierarchical WSNs Anomaly HIDS, NIDS
[3] Hierarchical 802.15.4, 802.11, Wired ethernet Anomaly HIDS, WIDS, NIDS
[68] Hierarchical RPL Anomaly NIDS
[67] Hierarchical RPL based 6LoWPAN Anomaly NDIS
[70] Hierarchical WSN Anomaly NIDS
[73] Hierarchical WSNs Anomaly NIDS
[71] Hierarchical WSNs Hybrid NIDS
[66] Hierarchical 6LoWPAN Hybrid NDIS
[65] Hierarchical watchdog Ipv6 WSN Specification NIDS
[11] Hybrid RPL based 6LoWPAN Hybrid NIDS
[76] Hybrid RPL Specification NIDS
[69] Hybrid RPL Anomaly NIDS
cover all three phases of the IoT layers and not in a holistic
manner.
In general, WSNs are given much focus in the literature.
As stated within the previous surveys, WSNs share similar
protocols, technologies and resources but fail to consider
internet driven attacks, e.g. DDoS or additional protocols e.g.
IEEE 802.3. IDS in WSNs are seen in all architecture forms
except a centralised manner. In contrast the IEEE 802.11
standards (within a constrained and IoT context) are seen in
a variety of architecture types, although work is considerably
less than the WSNs. Similarly protocols for 6Lowpan can be
seen across all architecture types. Therefore, we argue that
the wide variety of technologies across the IoT is a driving
force for its security due to the aforementioned issues related
to detection and interoperability.
B. Detection Types, Effectiveness and Suitability
There is diversity in architecture and detection types with
varying degrees of effectiveness to the variety of attack types
detected. NIDS are seen more than any other, often found
with anomaly detection methods. On the other hand, HIDS
are seen less commonly due, largely due to the excess resource
consumption required on the already constrained nodes.
Anomaly-based detection methods are seen more over mis-
use detection methods due to their smaller memory footprint
and as such are proven more effective on constrained protocols.
One alternative and most promising methods to network activ-
ity monitoring appears to be the monitoring of device resources
(e.g. [74]), as embedded devices are typically designed around
their power usage. Numerous mitigation methods for false pos-
itives have also been proposed in literature, which is a major
issue due to the variable nature of RF-based communications.
In addition, unconventional AI based methods such as [73])
may be seen with good levels of success. However, these
methods will typically cover only a few types of attacks and
not all layers.
Misuse techniques are seen less in the IoT work covered
within this review and others. Largely due to the constraints
upon the majority of these devices preventing the storage of
database of signatures. This would explain why these tech-
niques are mostly seen within centralised architecture types
which provide greater resilience against subversion but which
may maintain an incomplete picture of network activity if the
area is not sufficiently covered. The fact that misuse-based
methods are exemplar at detecting known attacks yet so little
work is seen is likely due to these resource constraints and the
ever increasing prominence of zero-day attacks negating their
effectiveness.
Detection techniques cover a range of attack types and
network layers but none appear to be comprehensive in terms
of attack type detected, wireless technologies, and networking
layers. An IDS which was developed truly for IoT would be
required to detect all types of attacks. In addition, it could be
argued that due to the previously discussed issues regarding
the open and insecure physical layer, implementing an IDS
on any sensor node itself can never be guaranteed to be
reliable. However these implementations which are in software
on the target device, as opposed to dedicated hardware, may
be suitable for less mission critical applications. Although for
networks with sensitive data which must be vitally protected
(e.g. military, health or any other under jurisdiction of data-
protection and privacy legislation’s), this lack of guarantee is
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unacceptable. At the minimum, it should be known whether
such intrusion software is reliable or not which may be
guaranteed via a third party.
C. Architecture
In regards to architecture, the least commonly seen form
is a centralised architecture. Typically data collection and/or
analysis is conducted in a decentralised manner. The ad-
hoc and distributed nature of the wireless networks being
the most prominent reason for this. Primarily as wireless
communications are difficult to comprehensively detect from
a centralised location due to the nature of RF transmission.
Additionally providing a more scalable and adaptable system
is suited to this architecture type.
The majority of the work reviewed focuses on minimizing
the footprint of the application in order to economise on
resource usage within distributed applications. However, it
could be argued that employing such mechanisms creates
multiple additional layers of complexity within the network
and system. This has many disadvantages such as an increase
in resource usage, increased attack surface, and general main-
tainability issues. Foremost, network overhead is considerably
increased, which will put more strain on the already con-
strained bandwidth. Finally, additional strain is put onto the
sensor nodes with increased processing and memory usage.
Further issues occur during implementation of such a system,
whereby each node to contain IDS software needs to have
additional code developed for it. Whilst this might be justified
for homogeneous network types, it proves more difficult for
IoT based networks. Due to the various devices, architecture
types vary considerably and thus; additional development time
may increase with network complexity. Also this additional
complexity creates new potential security vulnerabilities. High-
level programming solutions may mitigate the majority of
these issues but put considerable strain on the resources of
these constrained devices. An alternative to this distributed
architecture is hierarchical systems which are also seen often
within this work. They attempt to mitigate the aforementioned
issues of resource consumption on constrained nodes through
distributing this work more appropriately via node placement.
For example, more resource intensive tasks will be undertaken
by those nodes with more resources, or sometimes handled in
the majority by a central node. Dependent upon the particular
structure of the network, hierarchical structures may introduce
multiple weak points in the architecture by having one or
more points of failure/subversion (e.g., through falsifying or
nullifying alerts).
VII. PROPOSED IOT-IDS ARCHITECTURE
In the previous sections, we reviewed work within the area
of IDS for IoT and provided an analysis of the work. In
this section, we look at ways of mitigating some of the seen
issues via an architectural solution. The majority of the work
presented proposes solutions which seek to minimise resource
usage upon the resource constrained network whilst attempting
to maximize the efficacy of the process. This is accomplished
through additional software and or networking layer. Unfortu-
nately this ensures additional overhead and complexity within
the IoT network itself, which is arguably not acceptable in
heterogeneous networks of the IoT. A more effective solution
would remove this complexity and excess resource consump-
tion away from the IoT network. In addition, whilst distributing
the collection or analysis of data amongst nodes appears to be
an effective method of solving scalability issues; poor physical
security still leaves the issue of subvertible devices open.
Therefore, this does not comprehensively cover all network
layers. In what follows, we summarise important issues:
1) A wide variety of technology types amongst the IoT
causes poor coverage of all three IoT layers from any
solution. Multiple issues such as complexity and inter-
operability must be solved to mitigate this issue. Whilst
individual solutions may be suitable for individual use-
cases, issues of expendability and interoperability still
exist.
2) A considerable amount of detection techniques have
been presented with variable detection accuracy and
attack coverage. None appear to be able to cover all
attack types with good accuracy. This is partially due
to the variability of RF-based communications and
the resources available for capturing and processing.
The only real effective detection methods are hybrid
methods which require these resources.
3) The distributed nature of these systems causes dis-
tributed or hierarchical IDS to be the most prominent.
However, due to constrained resources these are difficult
to implement effectively and securely.
4) Fundamentally, the open-medium and constrained na-
ture of IoT devices leave them liable to subversion at the
physical layer. As such, they cannot be trusted security
services.
Taking the above into account, it is proposed that the most
effective and secure IDS solution would be one in which RF
monitoring is passively conducted via network probes, similar
to the work in [77] which applies this technique to WIFI net-
works and [52] which applies this to 6Lowpan networks. Both
of these techniques show merit and through various adaptations
could be extended to cover a wide number of IoT technologies
and attack scenarios. Specifically, a novel proposed system
would use hard-wired or secure point-to-point links to connect
network probes to an external site. These would be modular in
nature and thus permit a wide variety of technology types in
an extensible manner. For instance, optimised antennas could
provide varying levels of coverage across long distance and
large areas and for differing protocol types. The probes could
provide coverage of this communication to a back-end system
which would permit a number of modular detection methods.
In this case, a cloud-based system would be advantageous
to provide scalability; with potentially unlimited processing
facilitating any data analysis necessary. At the expense of
greater financial investment, such a solution will have the
following advantages over currently proposed solutions:
• Ability to externally process data and thus conduct re-
source intensive detection methods and comprehensively
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detecting attack types as described throughout literature.
• The ability to detect attacks on the physical layer and
above, which will provide monitoring for the entire
network and mitigate issues related to the open-medium
and untrustworthy nodes.
• Facilitate the monitoring of multiple node types whilst
not requiring additional code through a universal moni-
toring solution. Modularisation would enable extensibil-
ity and negate issues related to constrained technologies.
• Remote processing would negate any additional strain on
the resource constrained network or devices, in addition
to no additional layer of complexity.
• Create a more secure solution by moving the system to
a different layer than that to be monitored.
It is believed that such a system would be the most com-
prehensive (in terms of attack and device types monitored)
and a secure way to develop an IDS tailored specifically to
IoT. However, the following negative aspects will need to be
reviewed:
• Ensuring a secure connection between sniffer nodes
(point-to-point wireless links, or hard-wired lines).
• The cost of additional hardware.
• The cost incurred of potentially monitoring multiple RF
frequencies.
• The security of an external monitoring platform.
• The specific detection methods to employ.
• Lack of full coverage of a site and thus; getting an
incomplete picture of the network traffic.
However it is believed that for many mission-critical applica-
tions costs are negligible. The technology to implement such
a system is already available, with success shown in similar
systems for homogeneous WIFI networks [52].
A. System Description and Comparison
Figure 2 illustrates the ideal solution and a description of
its components and implementation considerations are given
below.
Architecture from the perspective of an IoT network would
be externally based in order to mitigate issues with the
solutions reviewed within this paper. Whilst other architectures
have issues relating to attack detection range and technology
type, these will be negated via probes and long range antennas.
Other reviewed architectures are presented in a distributed or
hierarchical form within only the perception layer. However,
these architectures may suffer from subversion due to place-
ment in a hostile environment whilst hierarchical architectures
suffer from varying single points of failure. Whilst a cen-
tralised architecture might also suffer from single point of a
failure, the proposed system could be supported by cloud/edge
and other dynamic and scalable infrastructures which mitigate
this issue.
The conceptualisation within Figure 2 illustrates that the
architecture encompasses all layers of the IoT model, as
opposed to just one which is covered by the majority of the
reviewed work.
Detection Methods traditionally vary in effectiveness across
IDS work reviewed in the IoT. Through hosting this IDS on
an external and scalable hardware, pluggable modules will
permit a wide variety of detection methods, as dictated within
literature, which will permit a wider range of attacks detected
than any other previously cited. In Figure 2, the remote IDS is
placed on a cloud service which will permit the introduction of
any and all detection methods required, with scalable resources
able to support them. This is deemed essential to an IoT
solution due to the constantly evolving attacks, technologies,
and environments. However, this method will only be able
to utilise network and not host-based detection which is
considered more reliable and effective within this context.
Despite many of the reviewed works have considerable merit
with their method of detection, the solutions suffer from poor
architectural underpinnings.
Technology Coverage is a fundamental issue within IoT
that drives security-based issues. Through external processing
placement and passive probes, which may use wide spectrum
and software defined radios, all technology types and protocols
may be covered through minimal hardware adaptations. This
enables highly adaptable, extensible and software-automated
upgrades that were not provided in the reviewed solutions. In
Figure 2, the proposed placement of the IDS also illustrates
that monitoring of other IoT layers including wired WAN
protocols and those at the application layer. This provides
enhanced coverage than those reviewed in literature. Addition-
ally through applying an external IDS, the integration of audit
logs from multiple areas, (i.e. those covering the transmission
and application phases of IoT) can provide a holistic intrusion
detection analysis.
B. System Analysis
The ability to retrieve information passively and export it
securely for remote processing offers great advantages. In
the previous section’s simplified example, it was shown that
analysis of the data as it is being sent by each node greatly
increases this capability. Purely transporting the raw, captured
data permits any processing needed through accomplishing this
on a remote server.
Many different attack types may be identified at an increased
rate, whilst minimising any additional resource load or com-
plexity within the IoT network itself. Overall, this creates a
more secure IoT based network, albeit at a greater expense
of introducing further hardware and requiring secure links to
a remote server. However, as the set of use-cases of the IoT
widens and societal infrastructure becomes more intertwined
with these systems, this additional cost may outweigh the
impact of a potential security breach. A final issue which may
occur with such a passive system is, of course, subversion
of the sniffer nodes themselves. This may be mitigated by
multiple collection nodes which will compare data and secure
links back to the remote processing site.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As interest in the IoT grows, its application will involve
more data sensitive projects. As such, ensuring its security
is a priority. With preventative measures difficult to be im-
plemented due to inherent architectural constraints, solutions
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Fig. 2. This diagram illustrates the proposed IDS for IoT which covers all three layers of the IoT model. The proposed IDS placement is indicated in red. A
local IDS sits close to the perception layer and provides static probes across the sensing environments to receive network data. Simultaneously it probes network
traffic heading for the application layer. This data is collaborated with a remote IDS which sits within the application layer and monitors traffic from the service
platform.
must turn to second line methods of defence. We examined
IDS as one such defence and determined that despite the
variety of existing systems available; none are able to defend
against all types of attacks (from the physical layer up) due to
their architectural implementation. Therefore, we discussed the
case that these methods are out-dated whilst not holistically
covering the whole IoT model. In order to comprehensively
secure IoT based networks built of heterogeneous device types,
a new approach must be taken. This involves the application
of more physical hardware, using network probes to collect
data and securely transport it to a remote server (likely cloud-
based) so as to perform detection types as resource intensive
as required.
Future works should consider full implementations through
development of an IDS for IoT, where data processing will
be computed upon a cloud system. The system will be tested
on a variety of physical hardware to examine the effect of
monitoring multiple different protocols in varied environments,
upon the data collection and analysis process.
The adoption of IoT based networks is inevitable, with
similar systems already seen for monitoring and control of
industrial systems (energy, water etc.). It is essential that
correct security solutions be found before wide-scale adoption
of insecure processes which widely assist modern society. The
solution presented here could be considered as a relatively
simple one, although further development and research will
need to take place to ensure it is optimal in a wide variety of
situations.
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